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South-Eastern Europe : History,
Concepts, Boundaries
Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis
1 This issue of Balkanologie gathers together a selection of papers presented at a special
conference organized by the Centre for South-East European Studies, London, dedicated
to exploring the idea of South-Eastern Europe.
2 There is no generally agreed definition of  South-Eastern Europe,  but there are many
reasons for this uncertainty. The most banal reason is that Europe is not symmetrical in
shape, and therefore does not lend itself with ease to division according to the points of
the compass. A second obvious reason is that the physical map of Europe differs from its
political configurations, and the relation between land and people is never simple. A third
reason is that numerous alternative names have been given to various parts of the South-
East  of  Europe,  and these  have generally  had preference.  A fourth is  that  Europe is
believed by many to have not only an East, West, North and South, but (and increasingly
in recent years) a Centre. This possibility, however remote, naturally affects the size of
the presumed South-East.
3 People  have  also  advanced  definitions  based  not  on  whether  the  region is  real,  but
whether it is good and beautiful, or bad and ugly ; worth invading, or best left well alone ;
peaceful or warlike ; ethically uncultivable, or ripe for improvement ; similar or different,
both to itself and to other regions. This problem is old : one of the most popular and
widely-disseminated texts  of  the  mediaeval  world,  composed in  either  the  5th or  6 th
centuries AD, illustrates the problem as well as any, with the following account of the
contrasts to be found in South-Eastern Europe :
In this part [of the world — one of the geographical klimata] are to be found the
Slavs and the Phisonites, also called Danubians. The former take pleasure in eating
women’s breasts filled with milk, and they break new-born babies against the rocks
like mice. The latter, on the other hand, avoid consuming even meat which can be
eaten lawfully and without reproach. The one are insubordinate, independent, reck
no master and frequently kill their chieftain when at table or travelling ; they eat
foxes,  wild cats and boar and call  out to each other with wolf-cries.  Do not the
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others refrain from excessive eating, and do they not submit to the authority of the
first comer ?1
4 This text is no longer well-known ; but the tendency for geographical accounts to produce
violently contrasting ethical judgements has not entirely disappeared.
5 At least Pseudo-Caesarius offered two variants on the nature of the region. Some offer
only one. Here the representative text of the 6th century would be that of the geographer
Kosmas Indikopleustes, who asserted that the world is not flat, but rises from the South-
East to the North-West, so that the northern and westerly zones elevate like a wall behind
which the sun sets. This explains why the northwestern ocean is very deep, and only
averagely so in the southern and eastern parts. The Nile, whose waters “rise” from the
south to the north, moves slowly, while the Tigris and the Euphrates flow swiftly, since
they “fall” southwards2. Just as for Kosmas the North-West was somehow “higher up” and
the South-East “lower down”, so for some modern writers categorization of peoples and
states  into  “Central  Europe”  and  the  “Balkans”  should  proceed  according  to  the
exemplarity or otherwise of the natives3.
6 We are not the first to question these questions of definition. The problem was often
secondary in Europe, except during periods of political upheaval in the region — but the
1990s has been just such a period, and much consideration has recently been given to
interrogating the categories whereby regions are defined. After 1989, which was assumed
by some to mark “the end of history”, came a kind of “rebirth of geography”, which
proposed  that  the  world’s  affairs  would  be  affected  more  by  profound  cultural
differences,  clearly divisible according to region, than by hard political or ideological
considerations4. This controversial thesis led scholars of many disciplines to re-examine
— or to examine for the first time, if they had not already done so — the bases upon which
regions are theorized and proposed. Critical histories of our region were produced5 and
ahistorical  judgements  were  criticized6,  confrontations  anticipated  and  myths  of
confrontation  exposed7.  Fashionable  words  included  “spectre”8,  “borderlands”9,
“invention”10,  “nationalism”11.  Geometry  became  tautologically  multiple,  and  ethnic
hatreds ancient.
7 The convenors of the conference, who are placing this selection before the public, hoped
perhaps to find a way out of the spiralling vacuum of metaphors and the Krise der Kreisen
by asking area specialists to consider the question of South-Eastern Europe in terms of a
particular  discipline.  For  not  only  the  world but  the  domain of  academic  enquiry  is
presupposed  to  divide  into  areas :  history,  geography,  anthropology,  literature,
linguistics, politics, and so forth. It was a 19th century conception that these “disciplines”
would contribute, each in its own way and according to its means, to the clarification of
such problems as the one we faced. Thus, the problem of how to define an area would be
elucidated by an appeal to distinct but well-defined “spheres” of analysis, and the nature
of a place would depend on a separate consideration of its language, customs, history,
races, literature, and other criteria (or lack thereof). These points would simply be added
up to provide an adequate account of a given people or region.
 
Debates on definitions
8 But there were obvious drawbacks to this approach. Regions were defined according to
one type of knowledge : the Balkans was said to be characterized narrowly according to
religion, or to selected common linguistic or ethnic factors, while factors of diversity
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were ignored. Furthermore, the boundaries generated by one set of disciplinary criteria
did not coincide with other definitions, leading to border disputes among area specialists.
9 Increasingly the Golden Calves of the traditional disciplines have been melted down in
the  late  20th century,  without  being  recast  into  one  larger  graven  image.  Scholars
congregate  in  new,  less  exclusive  churches  presided  over  by  the  deity  of
“interdisciplinarity”. But as far as South-Eastern European studies were concerned, this
process has been paradoxically difficult.  On the one hand, many South-East European
scholars,  faced  as  they  were  with  the  paucity  of  sources  (and the  frequent  need  to
improvise legitimacies for various causes) showed a remarkable versatility at an early
stage,  combining  ethnography  and  jurisprudence,  archaeology  and  study  of  religion,
paleolinguistics with anthropology : all in the search for valid arguments. On the other
hand,  the  problems  of  institution-building,  whether  in  impoverished  South-East
European states or in Western universities, led to intense competition over resources and
conflicting claims between disciplinary endeavours. Later on, notably in the 1980s and
early  1990s,  some  scholars  of  the  area  provided  valuable  critiques  of  the  roles  of
individual  disciplines  (and  the  competition  between  them)  in  developing  national
ideologies in South-Eastern Europe12. Nevertheless, the same specialists do not hesitate to
reclaim the importance of their particular furrow for the welfare of the field as a whole13.
An  important  debate  between  Ernest  Gellner  and  Edward  W.  Said  over  culture  and
orientalism, relevant to our discussion on region, degenerated into a spat about discipline
14 ; while some interesting ripples of irritation over discipline are presently corrugating
the ocean of Greek studies15. Such debates can contribute to a healthy awareness of the
specificities of individual disciplines — but it is still the task of knowing our subject in all
its complexity, and not only the methods, that should command our attention.
10 In spite of their territorial squabbles, the different disciplinary approaches have shared
problems in dealing with South-Eastern Europe. One of these has been the tendency to
analyze the region in terms of models and theories developed elsewhere, with the result
that South-Eastern Europe is often evaluated in terms of its likeness to or deviation from
Western Europe : hence discussions of whether the Ottoman system was feudal or not ; of
Balkan “backwardness” ; of “transition to democracy”. Not only are the questions framed
inappropriately ;  the  comparison  often  attributes  a  doubtful  unity  and  coherence  to
Western Europe, obliterating its diversity and changing character16.  At the same time,
identifying South-Eastern Europe as a unit of regional comparison in relation to the West
imposes an emphasis on its commonalities and cohesiveness, at the expense of its own
variety and complexity.
 
What criteria ?
11 How then might  we define and understand the region ?  Different  disciplines  suggest
different hermeneutic approaches. The centrality of history is perhaps inevitable, given
the fact that time came to constitute a fundamental category framing modern existence,
alongside  space,  and  will  not  be  easily  unlearned  or  forgotten.  However,  it  is  often
precisely those who most loudly proclaim the importance of history who degrade it by
giving  it  the  narrowest  definition,  confining  themselves  to  a  history  of  political
personalities and events17. And recent claims to make the history of Europe more “total”,
in the new international context, ignore that region which is our concern18. Even some
excellent Europe-wide studies dedicated to that supposedly Balkan subject par excellence
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which is nationalism, fail to take account of the South-Eastern European region in detail19
.  At the same time, the focus on the nation as the fundamental category of historical
narrative has deflected attention from other significant units, such as the wider region
(as well as the sub-national, the provincial, the local). Even attempts to approach the past
on a broad regional scale quite often become parallel national histories rather than truly
comparative efforts20.
12 But  the  question  of  what  criteria  should  frame a  discussion of  South-East  European
history has many possible answers. Should the definition arise from a series of shared
structures and attitudes, the legacy of a common past ? In this case, historical analysis
should probably proceed within the essentially political framework of empires, states and
other administrative units — obviating the need for a separate, South-East European unit
of analysis21. Or should the area be understood as an arena of interaction, its coherence (if
not  unity)  defined  in  terms  of  centuries  of  contact,  conflict  and  coexistence ?  This
approach is typified by frontier studies, exploring the character of zones united as much
as  divided  by  their  defining  boundaries22.  Or  the  area  could  be  approached  as  a
framework for comparison. This would follow Marc Bloch’s dictum that societies that
share common linguistic, political, religious, economic or historical spaces are the best
subject for comparative analysis, since they offer the best opportunity for identifying the
meaningful similarities and differences23.
13 In  fact  the  admission  of  the  “historical  imperative”  does  not  make  the  problem  of
defining South Eastern Europe any more clear cut. To a great extent the choice of criteria
depends on the prior intentions of the researcher. In this connection it is worth asking
how far the centrality of history in discussion of South-Eastern Europe is also a matter of
reading present-day preoccupations and purposes into the past24. The ways that versions
of  history  have  been  put  into  the  service  of  present  politics  have  been  repeatedly
addressed, not only by Western scholars25. Appeals to the past have also framed visions of
the region, from both within and without. Such claims — and their foundations — are now
coming in for sustained criticism, in the hope of greater intellectual rigour and better
official policies. It is open to question how far the second aim is realistic. One of the most
learned and influential  Western historians of the region, Noel Malcolm, has provided
thoroughgoing critiques of “myths” affecting the political crises in Bosnia and Kosovo,
and attacked the misleading appeals to history by the actors in these conflicts. Although
his work has brought many useful clarifications, Malcolm’s definition of “myth” simply in
terms of “historical untruth” is not sufficient to understand, let alone to prevent, ongoing
conflicts.  It  may even leave the  door  open for  new myths  to  enter  the  scene26.  The
questions of Bosnia and Kosovo are not (or not only) ones of “what really happened”, but
also ones of why different versions of the past continue to hold the meanings that they
do, and of why such importance is attributed to these meanings.
14 If a sense of historicity is important to attempts to define South-Eastern Europe, a sense
of diversity and conflicting patterns of culture, religion and language is no less necessary.
This  is  especially  relevant  to  attempts  to  define  South-Eastern  Europe  in  terms  of
“culture”. Grand regional schemes such as those elaborated by the Serbian geographer
Jovan Cvijić, or the slightly more limited ethnic and national classifications proposed by
his  successors,  singled  out  common  “ethno-psychological”  characteristics  shaped  by
shared historical experience and specific modes of subsistence, ultimately derived from a
particular  geo-physical  environment.  Similarly,  the Romanian historian Nicolae  Iorga
identified the development of rural social institutions in South-Eastern Europe as the
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basis of a common regional character27.  The problem is agreeing on which particular
traits are decisive in marking community and demonstrating regional unity ; and on how
far they override political, religious or linguistic difference.
 
Balkan culture
15 A different approach to the issue of diversity is that proposed by Traian Stoianovich, in
his Balkan Worlds, which attempts to place difference within a broader unity in a way that
parallels Fernand Braudel’s treatment of the Mediterranean — treating South-Eastern
Europe as speaking with many voices, its history the sum of many individual histories,
and seeing the Balkans as a microcosm and emblem of a divided Europe. But Stoianovich’s
Balkans are far less clearly defined than Braudel’s Mediterranean28. Again, the problem
remains precisely what is specifically Balkan about the area and its culture(s),  and is
there anything that holds its diversity together ?
16 A recent and important article by the Greek scholar Paschalis M. Kitromilides,  which
constitutes a valiant and fascinating attempt to assess the term “Balkan Mentality”, takes
up some of these issues29. Kitromilides dates the term “Balkan Mentality” to its usage by
Cvijić in 1918, and remarks on how the latter’s conceptualization of mentalité influenced
that of Braudel. He then rejects attempts to argue from ethnographic evidence in favour
of either unity or specificity, citing both ethnic diversity and the fact that such materials
can also be found elsewhere. Kitromilides goes on to criticize the notion of mentalité for
its lack of historicity, arguing that a “mentality” cannot be attributed to anything but
specific  historical  periods.  Asserting  that  the  emergence  of  nationalism  in  the  19th
century precluded the possibility of any common Balkan mentality, he chooses to focus
on three men, all Orthodox intellectuals of the mid-eighteenth to the early 19th century,
and declares that their outlook on the world is the closest one may come to a Balkan
mentality. A fascinating account of their lives is laid before us : but a number of basic
difficulties are not addressed. A “Balkan mentality” is subsumed to the idea of a set of
transnational loyalties and to « the “mentality” of Balkan Orthodoxy,  which,  few will
disagree I am sure, primarily defines religious belief in Southeastern Europe »30. But the
idea  of  mentalité is  not  reducible  either  to  religious  belief  or  to  transnational
consciousness. Furthermore, Orthodoxy was neither the sole religion in South-Eastern
Europe, nor confined to it31. One may also object that Kitromilides ignores the fact that
the Orthodox church both preserved and stimulated separate traditions within different
regions  of  the  Balkans32.  This  raises  very  pointedly  the  question  of  which  divisions
(ethno-linguistic ? political ? class ? religious ?) preclude a shared mentality and under
what  circumstances.  If  national  differences  annul  a  common  mentality  in  the  19th
century,  why  do  such  divisions  within  Orthodoxy  not  have  the  same  consequence ?
Kitromilides perceives the need to historicize the problem of collective mentalities, but
converts the Braudelian concept of prisons de la longue durée into some very particular
attributes of a small class of men. Meanwhile, the stress on Orthodoxy as a unifying factor
contradicts his earlier, rather inspired assertion that « 18th century Balkan society could
be understood as a world of concentric and overlapping circles within a broader space
whose  human  geography  was  defined  by  a  multiplicity  of  languages  and  religious
doctrines »33.
17 One solution to the problem might be to conceive of “Balkan culture” less in terms of
objective criteria, and more as an argument over meanings and definitions, advanced by
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particular people, in particular places, for particular purposes — existing as much in the
imagination as in the marketplace, in the linguistic community or in seats of political
power, and reconfigured in response to changing social, cultural and political processes34.
This  would  mean thinking  about  how the  region was  understood and viewed by  its
inhabitants, as well as by outsiders, and asking not whether cultural identifications such
as that  of  Cvijić were accurate,  but  what  symbols  they promoted,  what  images they
projected,  what interests  they were meant to advance.  Locally-generated concepts of
“Balkan culture” may have been in part the product of élite negotiations with notions of
Europe, the Levant or the Orient, but they were not just simple appropriations. In every
country comparable debates on identity produced particular theories, often in terms of a
shared relationship with the outside world ; in every country these ideas have percolated
into popular discourses. They covered a range of evaluations from the “stigmatic” to the
“utopian”35.
 
West vs. East
18 This leads us to another direction which became important in the 1990s : the study of
“alterity”, or otherness, generally seen as projected onto the region from without36. The
critical study of Westerners’ ideas and attitudes towards Eastern or South-Eastern Europe
is not a new preoccupation. But various factors have given new importance to what was
previously the domain of only a few researchers. The need to rethink the entire political
order of Europe after events of 1989 formed the general background ; new opportunities
for Westerners to travel East, and experience the region at first-hand, led to a further
need to  challenge received and outdated ideas ;  an acutely-felt  shortage of  adequate
literature and regional expertise in the West after that date could be cited as another
cause. The outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict brought with it rumours that US policy was
severely prejudiced by the essentialist opinions offered in a few sketchy travel books : it
was clearly time for the imagologists and orientalists to move in and provide us with a
clearer historical explanation of why Westerners think what they do about the East.
19 An important study in this direction was provided by L. Wolff which, using the works of
Foucault  and Edward W. Said in theoretical  support,  traced the origin of  the idea of
Eastern Europe to the writings of the philosophes and voyageurs of the (mainly French) 18th
century37. M. Todorova was wider in scope, covering writings from the 16th century to the
present day and presenting a case of remarkable polemical vigour against those who
would generalize unguardedly about the characteristics of the inhabitants of the South-
East38.  V.  Goldsworthy’s  book is  basically  of  the  same medicine  but  treats  a  specific
version of the myopic condition, namely the representation of the Balkans in popular
British  fiction,  travel  writing  and  reportage39 ;  while  Kiril  Petkov  traced  German
perceptions of the Balkan “other” in medieval and early modern textual attitudes40.
20 All these works provided a justified and necessary critique of the way the West looks East.
At the same time, however, we need to bear in mind the other half of the story. After all,
it  is  not as if  South-Eastern European writers are completely devoid of the tendency
towards mythologization or ideological evaluation of the East-West divide. Recent critical
studies  of  cultural  mentalities  from within  the  region  have  used  similar  theoretical
premises to come to a completely different conclusion : that the tensions within “South-
Eastern” or (to use the B-word) Balkan identities are often the result of local as much as
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Western, manipulations of geography and notions of civilization41. Where does the happy
medium lie ? And who is “inventing” whom ?
21 A comparative study of,  say,  Voltaire’s  Histoire  de  Charles  XII and Dimitrie  Cantemir’s
History of  the Ottoman Empire,  would surely show that both North-Western and South-
Eastern historians make use and abuse of “the map of civilization” — each for their own
purposes,  of  course,  but  indisputably  using  comparable  techniques.  Likewise,
ideologically  motivated  allegations  of  barbarism  are  not  the  exclusive  intellectual
property  of  the  Western enlightenment.  It  was  not  just  Bram Stoker  who implicitly
disparaged the nobility of the voevodes of the region ; a Turkish chronicler is on record as
describing  John  Hunyadi  —  with  obvious  political  intent  —  as  an  « uncouth  infidel
peasant »42.
22 To obtain a balanced picture of the role of literary discourse in shaping perceptions of the
region we need to take into account more than just the West’s — undeniably questionable
— ideological role and interests. Moreover, cultural critiques of images of the region have
paid  remarkably  little  attention to  important  Russian  and Ottoman perspectives43.  A
synthesis  comparable  to  Bernard  Lewis’s  brilliant  book44,  which  could  eventually
chronicle Balkan attitudes to the outside, might help us to reach a more justly complex
understanding of the problem. After all, as Montaigne pointed out long ago, we are all
somebody’s barbarians45.
23 Orientalist approaches nevertheless deserve credit for having problematized the popular
notion of the Balkans, revealed its constructed (and arbitrary) quality, and examined new
dimensions of the workings of power (certainly hegemonic, probably oppressive) that
continue to animate and sustain the notion.  Moreover,  they raise very pointedly the
question of how to do Balkan / South-East European studies at all — and whether South-
Eastern Europe or the Balkans can be a useful category of analysis, given the “invented”
quality of the concept and its political uses, let alone the fact that it is often a residual
category, defined more by what it is not than by what it is. The academic enterprise of
South-East European studies is unlikely to vanish overnight in a paroxysm of self-doubt,
although the concept of area studies generally — not just that of our region — is being
eroded with the end of Cold War imperatives ; criticisms of its lack of theoretical rigour ;
and a growing suspicion, in fields as far apart as rational choice theory and anthropology,
of the concept of “culture” as a meaningful variable. Still, institutional interests, within
and without both the academic milieu and the region itself, are likely to keep South-East
European studies going, at least for the time being. Funding initiatives responding to
continuing crises in the former Yugoslavia and their effect on the region as a whole, will
doubtless prolong the income-generating life of the Balkan idea, albeit at the cost of re-
defining and limiting the  sort  of  work that  is  done under  this  rubric.  Contestations
between  insiders  and  outsiders  and  between  specialists  and  generalists  over  who  is
authorized to “do” South-East  European studies  will  doubtless  continue.  The answer,
however, should not be one-sided46 ; and one of the positive developments of the past
decade has been an increasing degree of conversation, especially about methodology and
outlook, between scholars working in the region and in the West. But the question still
remains, is there any there there ?
24 The Orientalist / post-colonialist / post-structuralist critique has no real answer to this
question — or rather,  it  answers it,  but  in a way that  is  insufficient.  If  the imputed
differences that define “the Balkans” are simply the markers or epiphenomena of power
politics, then the implication can be that there is no reason to single out anything that is
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specifically Balkan. If the differentiation of Central Europe from territories “down there”
in the Balkans is  basically a matter of  establishing hierarchies,  and the signs of  this
difference  are  not  important  in  themselves,  what  if  anything  does  characterize  the
Balkans as a coherent or meaningful entity besides its image in the eye of others ? For
instance,  it  has  been shown that  the  cleanliness  of  the  inhabitants  in  South-Eastern
Europe was a question subject to manipulative generalization by Westerners in the 19th
century47. Yet however ideologically-motivated or influential such descriptions may have
been, they do not render the problem at hand — what was hygiene and sanitation like in
19th century South-Eastern Europe ? — either unanswerable or irrelevant in itself48. Since
the Orientalist critique is really about the West, and since the Western construction of the
Balkans is largely a by-product of its own process of self-definition, it is not very useful
for thinking about South-Eastern Europe in itself. Or to put it another way, this approach
focuses on the Balkans as the Other to the West, not on the Balkans as Self (except to the
extent that  it  explores the ways people in the Balkans accept,  internalize or contest
Western definitions, on unequal terms — but this too is really about Western hegemony).
In short, the Orientalist approach merely re-marginalizes the Balkans.
 
Contributions
25 The contributors to this issue have taken up these and other challenges, looking for ways
to ways to go beyond a critique of “Balkanism”, and suggesting other approaches to the
study of the area. They profess, respectively, the disciplines of political science (George
Schöpflin),  history  (Andrei  Pippidi),  anthropology  (Pamela  Ballinger),  and  literature
(Vesna Goldsworthy) - although it would be an injustice to accuse any of them of inability
to think about the region beyond their disciplinary specializations.
26 George Schöpflin,  pondering South-Eastern Europe’s  distance from Western European
norms of modernity, vigorously criticizes the post-structuralist critique’s emancipatory
promises ; the condescending assumption that Western rationalism provides a universal
explanatory  model ;  and  the  absence  in  this  approach  of  any  way  of  understanding
collective action. Posing the very useful question of why traditions, identities and myths
have such power, he calls for a return to notions of common culture as animating and
giving meaning to such identities, and he locates this culture in the specificities of South-
East European history.
27 The political scientist’s use of the notion of culture often necessitates that a compilation
of characteristics - whose origin are not dated, whose standard deviation is not taken into
account, and whose parameters are not given - be synthesized into an “average” model,
which is then redistributed. Schöpflin presumes a common regional identity, attempts to
define it with reference to selected traits, and posits a cultural unit with more or less
permanent and impermeable boundaries. He then proceeds to use this definition as an
analytical  tool.  But  the  traits  which define  South-Eastern  Europe  are  not  inherently
obvious, nor peculiar only to the region. Any attempt to define South-Eastern Europe
must  provide  a  theory  of  both  region  and  causation.  Mere  enumeration  of  internal
characteristics is not sufficient, because for most of the last two thousand years it has
been ruled from outside or from its margin, and because even theories of its homogeneity
must account for its variegation, in time as well as in space. A comparative approach may
suggest that a unique South-Eastern European culture does not necessarily underwrite
South-East  European  exceptionalism ;  and  that  South-Eastern  Europe’s  role  as  a
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measuring-rod to Central Europe may not last. Schöpflin is right, however, not to treat
the region as a tabula rasa which must passively await “transition” or “stabilization” from
above - a common assumption among authors of projects for reform both within and
without.
28 The discordances  between the  papers  in  this  volume reconfirm that  any  number  of
configurations are possible, and that the choice often depends on political purposes. As
Pamela Ballinger points out in her paper, the process becomes tautological : the same
traits that are chosen to define the region then become proof of its cultural unity. In the
end, this doesn’t help us grasp Balkan cultural specificity, or situate it in relationship to
other  areas  and  histories,  or  understand  Balkan  mentalities.  It  just  endorses  the
perceptions — and the politics — that we started out with.
29 One way out of this trap might be to conceive of “area” and of the Balkans / South-
Eastern  Europe  as  a  heuristic  device,  defined  for  specific  analytical  or  pedagogical
purposes, its boundaries seen as intellectual constructs, provisional, open to question and
over-lapping.  This  would  have  the  advantage  of  interrogating  definitions,  traits  and
boundaries,  rather  than  letting  them pass  unexamined.  It  would also  make  possible
comparative work across areas, raising issues of what variables are pertinent, at what
levels can comparisons be made, what differences and similarities are meaningful. And
this in turn might yield more convincing accounts of what it is that is particular to the
region. The same point might be made about more thematically-based research. But as
Ballinger  points  out,  even  heuristic  devices  have  a  habit  of  becoming  real  (or
institutionalized, which comes to much the same thing). They also, as Vesna Goldsworthy
shows,  can  have  real  political  consequences,  whether  intended or  not.  Furthermore,
thematic topics can all  too easily reproduce area definitions,  so that area once again
becomes explanation. Ballinger mentions post-socialism ;  discussions of gender and of
nationalism often go the same way49.
30 Andrei  Pippidi  observes that some choose to emphasize the unity of  the region,  and
others its diversity. His approach affirms a rigorous insistence on historical context, and
focuses on the ideas and structures that are relevant at a particular time, in particular
circumstances, to particular people. This avoids anachronistic reading into the past or
tautological definitions, and gives us a way of thinking about specificity — by comparing
Balkan phenomena with similar patterns in Northern and Western Europe, with other
Southern  European  peninsulas ;  by  investigating  specific  definitions,  identities  and
entities, their interrelations and their after-life as historical legacies. Many key models -
for instance the opposition between Central and South-Eastern Europe - are assessed as to
their age, their significance and their political valencies in different times. The models of
the Balkans that are put forward are in many ways older than we think, but also subject
to degrees of alteration over time, or “Changes of Emphasis”, as Pippidi has called them.
31 Can we guess what “changes of emphasis” the future will bring ? Pro-Europeans often
strive to emphasize the region’s similarity to the West ; while those who see the West and
the South-East as separate often entertain a negative vision of the other party. But there
should be room for both similarities and differences. A dolphin is not a fish : but a general
description  of  that  animal  which  noted  only  its  similarity  to  mammals  would  be
inaccurate. A key precondition of an adequate understanding of both regions will be a
dissociation of the notions of “difference” and “resemblances” from moralizing rhetoric.
As Schöpflin and Goldsworthy observe in their different ways, South-Eastern Europe will
not  necessarily  be  “better”  if  it  is  more  like  Western  Europe.  Nor  will  the  latter
South-Eastern Europe : History, Concepts, Boundaries
Balkanologie, Vol. III, n°2 | 2008
9
immediately  improve  either  by  dissociating  itself  further  from,  or  successfully
assimilating, the former. It should be possible to recognize that the peace and welfare of
the region is in the West’s interests, but that tolerance or unity cannot be imposed from
outside50.
32 The most unique features, like any ordinary birth mark or fingerprint, may not be the
most useful keys to character – but that is no reason to obliterate them. Comprehending
what is particular about the phenomenon were are examining is a necessary enterprise.
South-East European studies face the same challenge as the wider post-colonialist project
— finding ways of grasping historical specificity and particularity in a world where the
definitions and the desiderata have generally been elaborated elsewhere. We have become
accustomed to  seeing  the  world  as  culturally  and socially  constructed,  but  with  the
emphasis on the drawing-board and the planner’s office rather than on the construction
site itself. We have, to an extent, lost sight of the cultural materials — and the craftsman’s
techniques — that make this whole process possible and informs it. Pointing an accusing
finger at “the designs of Western hegemony” is not sufficient to explain the content or
shape of  cultures and societies that are thus built.  Nor is  it  conducive to identifying
factors of agency within the societies studied, particularly at the grass-roots level.
33 How do we go about this ?
34 An ongoing interrogation of the disciplines is essential. Are the fundamental questions of
the present academic démarche adequate for our context ? Not always, not entirely. The
questions  have  been  formulated  in  particular  circumstances,  and  are  not  easily
detachable from their contexts51. On the other hand, ideal types are not always designed
for reprojection onto real maps. The task of “locating” our analytical concepts must be
attended to prior to that of “describing” our objects of study52.
35 We  need  to  take  advantage  of  the  possibilities  of  interdisciplinary  work,  and  the
advantages in sharpening methodological and theoretical assumptions by working across
disciplines.  Here  the  issue  is  to  identify  what  sorts  of  problems  provide  the  right
framework for this sort of work. Fundamental is the set of issues around identity and the
conditions of its production, through textual, structural, historical analyses. Given the
function of the national as area-defining in our part of the world, differentiation in those
terms is probably the starting point, but this needs to be understood in terms of the
intersection of  the national  with other discourses53.  And this  necessarily then means
more serious analyses of these other forms of identity :  class,  religion and gender, of
course, but also individual, family, sexuality, profession, region.
36 This would open up a number of relatively unexplored issues. As historians, we note that
the lack of serious social history of all kinds is a problem which affects scholars in all
fields,  whether  they  are  political  scientists  looking  to  formulate  paradigms,
anthropologists  trying  to  date  the  contemporary  phenomena  they  are  recording,  or
students  of  literature seeking a  context  for  their  texts.  There has  been all  too little
research on social groups, structures and processes. Marxist schools of history in the
individual  countries  produced  relevant  work,  but  the  focus  on  class  struggle  and
progressive forces meant that entire spheres of human activity (women, nobility,  the
family, marginality) went largely unexplored. There were some stimulating attempts in
the West to elaborate theories of society and social change in the region54.  But these
initiatives were not often followed up in detail, and South-East Europeanists only rarely
attempted  the  sort  of  social  and  socio-political  analysis  that  absorbed  the  Western
historical profession in the 1970s and 1980s (perhaps partly because of the difficulties of
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archival research in the region). Western “history from below” sometimes approached
the trivial,  but  the  aspiration to  a  more total  exploration of  human experience  was
fruitful, and would certainly benefit our area. This is not to condemn the important study
of  states  and  élites,  but  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  states  and  élites  are  without
considering  their  social  consistency  and  the  extent  of  their  recognition.  The  harsh
domination  of  ruling  groups  and  the  gap  between state  and society  do  not  exclude
extensive social mobility which needs to be studied55. Or, to turn a Balkan proverb on its
head, not all fish rot from the head down.
37 On the other hand, a “Balkanocentric” vision of the world, which might try to suggest
that only what is specific, unique or original to the region is relevant to its study, will fail
to generate interesting conclusions. It is nearly twenty years since Katherine Verdery
pointed  out  that  even  accounting  for  apparently  compact  and  stable  rural  villages
requires  a  long  distance-view over  centuries  and  regions :  « with  anything  less,  one
cannot adequately render intelligible the actions of villagers or comprehend why their
lives take the form they do »56.
38 So comparative projects, within an area, and across regions. Even the most powerful, and
the most oft-invoked “defining characteristics” of the region are not incomparable with
other  regions.  The  great  so-called  “legacies” :  the  Ottoman,  the  Byzantine,  the
Communist, affected the region profoundly but also operated in other territories, and
cannot  be  studied  in  their  totality  if  South-East  Europe  is  examined  hermetically57.
Characteristic “Balkan” institutions spread beyond the region : for instance, the Habsburg
Empire’s treatment of the Orthodox population in her southern confines owed more to
the model of the Ottoman millet than to the example of her former Spanish possessions.
There is no reason why attitudes to minorities, or violence, or the character of state-
building  in  South-Eastern  Europe  cannot  bear  comparison  with  other  situations  in
Europe, or for that matter South-East Asia or South America, although necessary care
should be taken as to context58.
39 Some writing recently about Eastern Europe in general have remarked how the region
perhaps may only be defined not in terms of common roots or an international culture
but an atomization and a consciousness of distance from the West59. But solidarities are
never so geometrical. Moreover, an ambiguous attitude to Europe can be found in Spain,
Scandinavia and the British Isles, as well as in the Czech Republic. And to understand
even Western or Central Europe requires an understanding of what is going on elsewhere
60.  South-East Europe, then, is not a mere reflection or defiant mirror held up to the
North-West or the centre : for the mirror is in the minds of us all, wherever we come from
61. It is not the opposite of “North-Western Asia” either. It is a reality whose meaning may
be subject to normal contestation, but whose contentiousness does not have to be its most
characteristic feature. The name we have chosen to examine, and to accept with all due
disclaimers befitting a convention, benefits from being both provisional and specific ;
arbitrary but also accurate ; distinct, but also connected to a wider world. South-Eastern
Europe will always be part of what geographers have not yet called The Ural Pensinsula,
namely Europe ; ignore it at your peril.
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